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Mental modelsCausal counterfactuals e.g., ‘if the ignition key had been turned then the car would have started’ and causal condi-
tionals e.g., ‘if the ignition key was turned then the car started’ are understood by thinking about multiple possibil-
ities of different sorts, as shown in six experiments using converging evidence from three different types of
measures. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that conditionals that comprise enabling causes, e.g., ‘if the ignition key
was turned then the car started’primedpeople to readquickly conjunctions referring to the possibility of the enabler
occurring without the outcome, e.g., ‘the ignition key was turned and the car did not start’. Experiments 2a and 2b
showed that people paraphrased causal conditionals by using causal or temporal connectives (because, when),
whereas they paraphrased causal counterfactuals by using subjunctive constructions (had…would have). Experi-
ments 3a and 3b showed that people made different inferences from counterfactuals presented with enabling con-
ditions compared to none. The implications of the results for alternative theories of conditionals are discussed.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction
Our primary research question is, what possibilities do people
envisage when they understand a causal counterfactual, e.g., ‘if the
ignition key had been turned the car would have started’? The causal
counterfactual appears to convey something very different from its
conditional counterpart, e.g., ‘if the ignition key was turned the car
started’ (e.g., Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968). People create counterfactual
alternatives to reality frequently in everyday life, when they think about
how events in the past could have turned out differently, ‘if only’
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Roese & Olson, 1995). The counterfactual
conjecturemay help them towork out the various causes of an outcome,
and to prepare for the future (e.g., Mandel, Hilton, & Catellani, 2005;
Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009). Counterfactual thoughts tend to focus
on background conditions, that is, enabling causes, rather than on direct,
strong causes (Byrne, 2005). For example, participants who read a story
about a drunk driver who crashed into an individual driving home by an
unusual route identiﬁed the cause of the accident as the drunk driver,
but they created counterfactual alternatives such as ‘if only he had
driven home by his usual route’ (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; N'gbala &
Branscombe, 1995). They tend to focus on enabling conditions rather
than strong causes, perhaps because the removal of an enabler within
their control effectively prevents a bad outcome even when the cause
is outside their control (Byrne, 2007; Egan, Frosch, & Hancock, 2008).niversity of Leicester, Henry
UK. Tel.: +44 116 229 7189.
license. And so our second question is, what possibilities do people envisage
when they understand a causal conditional that refers to an enabling
cause such as ‘if the ignition key was turned the car started’? The enabler
is a necessary cause to bring about the outcome but it is not sufﬁcient,
that is, the outcome requires other causes to be fulﬁlled as well, e.g.,
there is petrol in the car, the battery is charged, and so on (e.g., De
Neys, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005; Markovits, Lortie Forgues, &
Brunet, 2010). We report six experiments to answer these two research
questions, by converging evidence from three different methods – causal
conditionals as primes, paraphrases of causal conditionals and counter-
factuals, and inferences from causal conditionals and counterfactuals.
The experiments show that people keep in mind multiple possibilities
when they think about counterfactuals, and when they think about en-
abling causes. First we outline how people understand and reason from
ordinary conditionals, then causal conditionals, and then counterfactuals.
1.1. Ordinary conditionals
How do people understand and reason from conditionals? In fact,
there is as yet no consensus (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009). One
view is that people understand an ‘ordinary’ or indicative conditional, ‘if
there is a triangle on the blackboard then there is a circle’ (if A then B)
by thinking about rules of inference, either abstract (Braine & O'Brien,
1998; Rips, 1994) or domain speciﬁc (Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000;
Holyoak & Cheng, 1995). Another view is that they understand it by
thinking about probabilities: they assume the truth of the antecedent, A,
and assess whether B or not-B is more probable (Evans & Over, 2004;
see also Oaksford & Chater, 2007). A third view is that they understand
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ple of truth ensures that they think about only the true possibilities that
are consistent with the conditional: a triangle and a circle, no triangle
and no circle, and no triangle and a circle; and they do not think about
false possibilities that are ruled out by the conditional — a triangle and
no circle (Espino & Byrne, 2012; Espino, Santamaria, & Byrne, 2009;
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Because of the constraints of working
memory they also tend to think about few possibilities (Johnson-Laird,
Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992), and so they understand the conditional by
envisaging initially just a single model, a triangle and a circle (A and B),
as Table 1 outlines.
On this account, people can readily make themodus ponens inference
(A therefore B) because itmatches the initial possibility they have kept in
mind. They have more difﬁculty with themodus tollens inference (not-B
therefore not-A) because they must think about some of the other
true possibilities, e.g., not-A and not-B, in order to make it. They tend to
make the afﬁrmation of the consequent inference (B therefore A),whenev-
er they keep in mind the initial possibility and fail to think of other true
possibilities, e.g., not-A and B. They make the denial of the antecedent
inference (not-A therefore not-B) when they have thought about some
of the alternative possibilities (not-A and not-B) but not others (not-A
and B). The interpretation of a basic conditional can be modulated by
its content and context (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), as illustrated by
conditionals with causal content, in the next section.
1.2. Causal conditionals
How do people understand and reason from causal conditionals?
Causal conditionals can refer to different sorts of causes (e.g., Goldvarg
& Johnson-Laird, 2001). They can express a strong cause, e.g., heating
water to 100° causes it to boil, which is both necessary and sufﬁcient
for the outcome. They can express one of several alternative weak
causes, e.g., arson caused the Australian bushﬁres, or accidental sparks
from campﬁres caused them, any one of which is sufﬁcient but not
necessary. Or they can express one of several joint enabling conditions,
e.g., arson caused the bushﬁres, enabled by the presence of dry vegeta-
tion, any one of which is necessary but not sufﬁcient.
Alternative views exist about whether causes and enabling rela-
tions differ in terms of their meaning or logic, or in terms of charac-
teristics such as normality, conversational relevance, constancy
and covariation (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1992; Einhorn & Hogarth,
1986; Hilton & Erb, 1996; Sloman, 2005; Turnbull & Slugoski, 1988).
The interpretation of causality is controversial. One view is that
people may think about different possibilities to mentally represent
different sorts of causes (e.g., Frosch & Johnson-Laird, 2011; Goldvarg
& Johnson-Laird, 2001; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).
Our focus is on enabling causes, and the possibilities that people con-
sider for enabling causes. Most people consider that the enabling condi-
tional ‘if the ignition key was turned then the car started’ is consistentTable 1
The consistent possibilities for indicative and counterfactual conditionals expressing
basic content and enabling causal relations; with information on strong and weak
causes for comparison.
Indicative Counterfactual
If A then B If A had been then B would have been
Basic A and B A and B (Conjecture)
Not-A and not-B Not-A and not-B (Presupposed facts)
Not-A and B Not-A and B
Enabler A and B A and B (Conjecture)
Not-A and not-B Not-A and not-B (Presupposed facts)
A and not-B A and not-B
Strong A and B A and B (Conjecture)
Cause Not-A and not-B Not-A and not-B (Presupposed facts)
Weak A and B A and B (Conjecture)
Cause Not-A and not-B Not-A and not-B (Presupposed facts)
Not-A and B Not-A and Bwith the possibility, the key was turned and the car started (A and B),
and with the possibility, the key was not turned and the car did not
start (not-A and not-B). But the full interpretation of the causal condi-
tional depends on the retrieval of counterexamples (De Neys, 2011;
De Neys et al., 2005; Markovits et al., 2010; see also Geiger &
Oberauer, 2007). In this case people appear to think readily about
disablers, e.g., the key was turned and the car did not start, perhaps
because the battery was dead (A and not-B), that is, they judge the
cause to be consistent with a third possibility. They do not tend to
think of alternative causes, that is, possibilities consistent with the key
not being turned and the car starting anyway. Their interpretation of
the conditional as an enabling causal relation rules out as false the pos-
sibility that the key was not turned and the car started (not-A and B).
Peoplemakedifferent inferences fromdifferent causal relations because
of the availability of counterexamples (e.g., Byrne, 1989; Byrne, Espino,
& Santamaria, 1999). As a result, for an enabling cause, they make the
afﬁrmation of the consequent (B therefore A) and denial of the anteced-
ent (not-A therefore not-B) inferences only, and they resist the modus
ponens (A therefore B) andmodus tollens (not-B therefore not-A) infer-
ences, because they can retrieve a disabler — the battery being ﬂat
caused the car not to start (e.g., Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist,
1991; De Neys et al., 2005; Markovits & Potvin, 2001).
An enabling cause can be contrasted with other sorts of causes, such
as a weak cause. For example, most people judge that a cause such as
‘if the apples were ripe then they fell from the tree’ is consistent with
the possibility, the apples were ripe and they fell from the tree (A and
B), and with the possibility, the apples were not ripe and they did not
fall from the tree (not-A and not-B). In this case people appear to think
readily about counterexamples based on alternative causes, that is, they
judge that the cause is consistent with a third possibility, that the apples
were not ripe and they fell from the tree anyway, perhaps because of
strongwinds (not-A and B). They do not tend to think readily of disablers
in this case, that is, possibilities consistent with the apples being ripe and
not falling from the tree, and so this possibility is ruled out as false. Hence
the interpretation of the conditional is as a weak causal relation. For a
weak causal relation, they make the modus ponens (A therefore B) and
modus tollens (not-B therefore not-A) inferences but they resist the afﬁr-
mation of the consequent (B therefore A) and denial of the antecedent
(not-A therefore not-B) inferences.
For a third sort of causal relation, a strong cause, such as ‘if Joe cut his
ﬁnger then it bled’ (A causes B), people tend to think of just two
possibilities: he cut his ﬁnger and it bled (A and B) and he did not cut
his ﬁnger and it did not bleed (not-A and not-B), as Table 1 shows.
Most people donot tend to think readily of disablers, that is, possibilities
consistent with Joe cutting his ﬁnger and it not bleeding, and they do
not tend to think of alternative causes, that is, possibilities consistent
with Joe not cutting his ﬁnger and it bleeding— even if such possibilities
exist (e.g., Cummins et al., 1991; De Neys et al., 2005). Hence they come
to an interpretation of the causal relation as a strong cause, which rules
out as false two possibilities: he cut hisﬁnger and it did not bleed (A and
not-B) and hedid not cut his ﬁnger and it bled (not-A and B). As a result,
people make all four inferences from a strong cause. Enabling causes
tend to be focused on when people create counterfactual conditionals,
and so we turn now to a consideration of counterfactuals.
1.3. Counterfactual conditionals
Counterfactual conditionals often express causal claims (e.g.,
Thompson & Byrne, 2002), and the relation between counterfactuals
and causal assertions has long been of interest to philosophers and psy-
chologists (e.g., Byrne, 2011; Chisholm, 1946; Hoerl, McCormack, &
Beck, 2011). Evenwith non-causal content, a counterfactual conditional
in the subjunctive mood, e.g., ‘if there had been a triangle then there
would have been a circle’ seems to mean something very different
from an indicative one, ‘if there was a triangle then there was a circle’
(Lewis, 1973; Stalnaker, 1968). People tend to judge that someone
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gle, and there was not a circle (Thompson & Byrne, 2002). When they
are given an unexpected memory test after reading the counterfactual,
they mistakenly recall there was not a triangle, and there was not a cir-
cle (Fillenbaum, 1974). They are primed to read quickly the conjunc-
tions corresponding to there was not a triangle and there was not a
circle when they have ﬁrst read a counterfactual but not when they
have read an ordinary conditional (Santamaria, Espino, & Byrne,
2005); whereas they tend to read the conjunction corresponding
to there was a triangle and there was a circle equally quickly after a
counterfactual and an ordinary conditional.
These results suggest that people tend to think about two possibili-
ties when they understand a counterfactual. They think about the con-
jecture, a triangle and a circle, and they think about the presupposed
facts, no triangle and no circle. From a counterfactual, they readily
make the inferences that require access to the presupposed facts (the
modus tollens and denial of the antecedent inferences) as well as the in-
ferences that require access to the conjecture (the modus ponens and
afﬁrmation of the consequent inferences) (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; see also
Egan, Garcia-Madruga, & Byrne, 2009; Moreno-Rios, Garcia-Madruga, &
Byrne, 2008). They do so for counterfactualswith various sorts of content,
including causal content and deontic content (Quelhas & Byrne, 2003;
Thompson & Byrne, 2002).
Our aim in this paper is to examine the mental representations
that people construct of causal conditionals and counterfactuals. The
ﬁrst two experiments (1a and 1b) examine the possibilities that
are primed by indicative conditionals that express enabling causal
relations. We expect that when participants read an enabling cause,
e.g., ‘if the ignition key was turned then the car started’, they will
readily construct not only the possibility, ‘the ignition key was turned
and the car started’ but also the possibility ‘the ignition key was
turned and the car did not start’ and so they will be able to read
rapidly conjunctions describing these possibilities. The next two exper-
iments (2a and 2b) compare the paraphrases that participants produce
of causal conditionals and counterfactuals, e.g., ‘if the ignition key had
been turned the car would have started’. We expect that their para-
phrases of causal counterfactuals will reﬂect not only the possibility
described in the counterfactual, ‘the ignition key was turned and the
car started’ but also the presupposed facts ‘the ignition key was not
turned and the car did not start’. The ﬁnal two experiments (3a and
3b) compare the inferences people make from counterfactual condi-
tionals when enabling conditions are made explicitly available and
when they are not. We expect that when a context is provided that
explicitly refers to other enabling causes, e.g., ‘there is petrol in the
car’, and alternative causes, e.g. ‘the car has a start button’, inferences
such as modus ponens (A therefore B) and denial of the antecedent
(not-A therefore not-B) will be suppressed for counterfactuals.
2. Experiments 1a and 1b: enabling conditionals
The aim of Experiments 1a and 1b was to examine the sorts of possi-
bilities people think about when they understand causal conditionals
about enabling relations. We examined the possibilities that people en-
visage when they understand indicative causal conditionals by measur-
ing the length of time it took them to read conjunctions (Espino et al.,
2009; Santamaria, Espino, & Byrne, 2005; see also De Vega & Urrutia,
2011; De Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007; Ferguson& Sanford, 2008). Consid-
er for example a causal conditional about amedicine bottle, ‘if the lidwas
twisted then the bottle opened’, presented in the context of a story in
which another enabling cause has also been mentioned, ‘the lid has to
be squeezed for it to open’, so that it is clear that the causal relation de-
scribed in the conditional is an enabling one. When a subsequent con-
junction refers to the situation in which ‘the lid was twisted but the
bottle did not open’, we expect that the enabling causal conditional will
prime individuals to read the conjunction rapidly, compared to a baseline
control condition.We carried out two experiments to test this prediction.In Experiment 1a participants read stories that contained conditionals in-
stantiated in 24 different contents. Experiment 1b replicated its results
with a subset of 12 of these stories, presented along with ﬁller items.
The two experiments produced the same results and accordingly we re-
port them together.
In the experimentswe gave participants short stories that contained
enabling relations, presented line by line on a computer screen:‘Martin was telling Laura about his medicine bottle. Line 1
He told her that the lid had to be squeezed for it to open. Line 2
He also said, Line 3
if the lid was twisted then the bottle opened. Line 4
When Martin showed Laura the bottle, Line 5
she saw that the lid was twisted and the bottle did not open. Line 6
Laura went to get a drink.’ Line 7Wepresented the conditional, ‘if A then B’ (in line 4) andwe ensured
that it was interpreted as an enabler by presenting it in the context of
an additional requirement, C which had to occur for B (in line 2). We
measured the length of time it took participants to read a subsequent
conjunction, in line 6 (e.g., A and not-B). In all scenarios, the target
conjunction occurred in line 6 and referred to either A and B, A and
not-B, not-A and B, or not-A and not-B. In Experiment 1a, we used a
different content for each sort of conjunction. In Experiment 1b, we
replicated the experiment using a subset of the scenarios. We again
used a different content for each sort of conjunction and we ensured
that the same contents were used in both the enabling and baseline
conditions. We included ﬁllers of strong and weak causes to ensure
that any priming effects of enabling causes could not be attributed
merely to the presence of any causal conditional.
We compared the reading times for conjunctions in the context of
the extra information about the enabling causal relation, to the reading
times for the same conjunctions presented in ‘baseline’ scenarios that
were similar but did not contain a conditional ‘if A then B’. Instead line
4 provided ﬁller information about A's attribute or location, e.g.,the lid on the bottle was white. Line 4We hypothesised that reading a causal conditional would prime
participants to read quickly the conjunctions that describe the true pos-
sibilities that are consistent with it (Espino et al., 2009; Santamaria
et al., 2005). For an enabling relation, these possibilities are A and B,
not-A and not-B, A and not-B (see Table 1).2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The participants in Experiment 1a were 22 students who partici-
pated for either course credit or 8 euro, most of whom were students
at Trinity College (and 2 visiting transition year school pupils). Their
mean age was 20 years (range 15–27 years) and there were 9 men
and 13 women. They were selected from an initial pool of 41 volun-
teers based on principles for inclusion derived from Santamaria et al.
(2005), namely that participants were included in the data analysis
who contributed at least 83% of data points to the analysis. Data points
were omitted when participants answered the questions at the end of
the scenarios incorrectly or when their reading times were outliers
(12 participants were excluded for answering 4 or more questions
incorrectly and 9 for having a combination of 4 or more outliers and
incorrect responses).
The participants in Experiment 1b were 19 volunteers recruited at
the University of Reading who participated for £8. Their mean age was
30 years (range17–56 years) and there were 2 men and 17 women.
They were selected from an initial pool of 34 volunteers based on the
same principles for inclusion. (We therefore excluded 6 participants
1 In Experiment 1a, consistent with our inclusion criteria described above, 51 of 528
reaction times (10%) were not included in the analysis, 41 due to incorrect responses
and 10 due to outliers. In Experiment 1b 100 of 912 reaction times (11%) were not in-
cluded in the analysis, 70 due to incorrect responses and 30 due to outliers.
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nation of 8 or more outliers and incorrect responses).
2.1.2. Materials
In Experiment 1a, we employed 24 different scenarios based on
the structure of the materials used by Santamaria et al. (2005). The
ﬁrst sentence set the scene (e.g., ‘Martin was telling his friend Laura
about his medicine bottle’). The second sentence contained an addi-
tional requirement for the conditional (e.g., ‘He told her that the lid
had to be squeezed for it to open’). It was designed to ensure that
the relation expressed in the subsequent conditional was interpreted
as an enabling condition, as its action needed to be carried out in conjunc-
tion with the action described in the conditional (e.g., squeezing the lid
and twisting it). A pre-test conﬁrmed that thematerials were understood
as enabling conditions. Eighteen participants,who did not take part in the
main experiment, judged whether the four possible conjunctions were
consistent or inconsistent with each scenario, for 38 scenarios. For the
enabling conditions the conjunction A and not-B was judged as consis-
tent 44% of the time, signiﬁcantly more than for materials describing
strong causes (4%) and weak causes (2%, Friedman's test, ℵ2 (2)=22.8,
pb .001). We selected 24 scenarios identiﬁed as the most suitable based
on participants' ratings (see Appendix A).
The third sentence was of the form, ‘He also said’ and the fourth
sentence was a conditional describing an enabling relation (‘If the lid
was twisted then the bottle opened’). The ﬁfth sentence was a ﬁller
(‘When Martin showed Laura the bottle, she saw that’). The sixth
sentence was the target conjunction describing a possibility derived
from the conditional (e.g., ‘The lid was twisted and the bottle did not
open’). There were four different conjunctions, e.g., ‘the lid was twisted
and the bottle opened’ (A and B), ‘the lid was twisted and the bottle did
not open’ (A and not-B), ‘the lid was not twisted and the bottle opened’
(not-A and B), and ‘the lid was not twisted and the bottle did not open’
(not-A and not-B). The seventh sentence was a ﬁller sentence about
what one of the characters did next (‘Laura went to get a drink’).
The materials for the baseline condition were identical to the
experimental condition, except for a change to line four of the scenario:
instead of a conditional, participants were presented with a ﬁller
sentence about the colour or location of the antecedent of the condi-
tional used in the experimental condition (‘The lid on the bottle was
white’). Information about the antecedent was included in the baseline
condition to ensure that the object ‘lid’ was referred to equally in the
experimental and baseline conditions. All the scenarios had essentially
the same syntactic structure, the same wording and the same number
of words. In Experiment 1b, the materials consisted of 12 scenarios
which were a subset of the materials used in Experiment 1a.
Each scenario was followed by a question about one part of the
scenario. Half of those questions required a ‘yes’ response and half a
‘no’ response. We included the questions to ensure that participants
were paying attention when they were reading the scenarios.
2.1.3. Design
In both experiments there were two independent variables, the sort
of conjunction (A and B, not-A and B, A and not-B, not-A and not-B) and
the sort of scenario (enabler or baseline). The dependent measure was
the reading times for the conjunctions. The design was fully within
participants. In Experiment 1a there were 8 experimental conditions
(2 conditions – enabler and baseline –×4 conjunctions). Three trials
of each condition were given to each participant, making a total of 24
trials, and the 24 trials were instantiated in 24 different contents.
Experiment 1b had the same 8 experimental conditions (baseline or
enabler condition×4 conjunctions). Once again three trials of each
condition were given to each participant, making a total of 24 trials.
However, the participants received the same 12 different contents
for the enabler condition (3 contents for each of the 4 conjunctions)
as they did for the baseline condition. The participants also received asmany ﬁller items, based on strong and weak causes and instantiated
in the same 12 contents, making a total of 48 trials.
2.1.4. Procedure
The procedure was essentially the same in both experiments. We
tested participants in small groups or individually. In Experiment 1a,
the materials were presented on Macintosh e-Mac computers (with all
extensions switched off and a CD in the CD-drive) using Superlab 1.75
software; in Experiment 1b, the experiment was presented on a PC
running Windows 2000 using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, &
Zuccolotto, 2002). Completion of the experiment took approximately
15 min for Experiment 1a, and about 30 min for Experiment 1b. The
scenarios were presented on the computer screen, one sentence at a
time. Presentation of the scenarios was self-paced in that participants
pressed the space bar when they were ready to move on to the next
sentence. The space bar press resulted in the disappearance of the current
sentence and the presentation of the next sentence. We measured how
long it took them to read the conjunctions, that is, the time between
the space bar press for one sentence and the following sentence.
2.2. Results and discussion
Based on Santamaria et al. (2005), before any data analysis we identi-
ﬁed outliers as any latency thatwas less than themean latency divided by
two or greater than themean latency plus 3 times the standard deviation.
Each outlier was replaced with a missing value code and removed from
the analysis. Only latencies for correct responses were analysed.
In Experiment 1a there was a main effect of condition (enabler
versus baseline), F(1,21)=32.48, MSe=.027, pb .001, a main effect of
conjunction, F(3,63)=9.45,Mse=.051, pb .001, and the two factors did
not interact, Fb1 as shownby the 2 (conditional, baseline) by 4 (conjunc-
tion: A and B, A and not-B, not-A and B, not-A and not-B) ANOVA with
repeated measures on both factors, on the log-transformed data.1
In Experiment 1b therewas amain effect of condition (enabler, baseline);
F(1, 18)=9.85, Mse=.18, p=.006, a main effect of conjunction;
F(3, 54)=30.37,Mse=.04, pb .001, and the two factors did not interact
(Greenhouse Geisser F=2.23, p=.107).
Planned comparisons were carried out in each experiment to test
our four predictions (see Winer, 1971 for a justiﬁcation for carrying
out planned comparisons on a non-signiﬁcant interaction). As expected,
the A and B conjunction was read faster when it was primed by the
enabler compared to the baseline condition, in Experiment 1a t(21)=
4.14, pb .001; and Experiment 1b t(18)=4.40, pb .001, as Fig. 1
shows. Also as expected the A and not-B conjunction was read faster
when it was primed by the enabler, compared to the baseline in
Experiment 1a, t(21)=2.82, pb .01; and in Experiment 1b; t(18)=
2.46, p=.024. Unexpectedly, the not-A and not-B conjunction was not
primed by the enabler, in either Experiment 1a, t(21)=1.43, p=.166
or Experiment 1b, t(18)=1.11, p=.281. Fourth, as expected, the
not-A and B conjunction, which corresponds to the false possibility for
the enabler, was not primed in either Experiment 1a; t(21)=1.86,
p=.077 or Experiment 1b; t(18)=1.622, p=.122.
We carried out planned interaction contrasts to compare the
difference between the enabler and the baseline, between each of
the conjunctions. The difference between the enabler and the base-
line was greater for the A and B conjunction compared to the not-A
and not-B conjunction, in Experiment 1a, F(1, 21)=4.418, p=.045,
and in Experiment 1b, F(1, 18)=4.319, p=.052. The difference
between the enabler and the baseline was also greater for the A and
B conjunction compared to the not-A and B conjunction, although









Baseline Enabler Baseline Enabler
















Fig. 1. The mean reading times (in milliseconds) for the baseline and after the enabling
conditional in Experiments 1a and 1b (bars are standard error).
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parisons in Experiment 1b were signiﬁcant, Fb1 in all cases except
for the difference between the A and B conjunction and the A and
not-B conjunction, F(1,18)=2.517, p=.130.
The reliable main effect of conjunction in the two experiments
reﬂects a trend that the A and B conjunction was read more quickly
than the A and not-B one, which typically was read more quickly
than the two conjunctions which start with a negation (not-A and
not-B and not-A and B), as Fig. 1 shows. We did not analyse these
differences as the conjunctions differ in their number of words, in
particular with regard to the presence of negations, which take longer
to read (Schroyens, Schaeken, & D'Ydewalle, 2001).
The A and B conjunctionwas primed by the enabler compared to the
baseline condition, consistentwith the proposal that the initial possibil-
ity that individuals think about for conditionals includes the compo-
nents mentioned (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Enablers primed two
of the expected consistent possibilities A and B, and A and not-B, but
not the third consistent possibility, not-A and not-B. Individuals may
not have thought about this possibility because of working memory
constraints (e.g., Jahn, Knauff, & Johnson-Laird, 2007). An alternative
interpretation is that people interpret enablers as consistent with just
these two possibilities and they consider the other possibilities to be
false (i.e., not-A and B and not-A and not-B). However, such an interpre-
tation is inconsistent with the ﬁnding from the pre-test that the not-A
and not-B conjunction was rated as consistent on 89% of trials. Impor-
tantly, participants did not think about the false possibility for an
enabler, not-A and B (Espino et al., 2009).
The two priming experiments provide evidence that people think
about multiple possibilities when they understand causal conditionals
that contain enabling causes. People envisage the possibility mentioned
in the enabling causal conditional, ‘A and B’ but they also envisage the
possibility ‘A and not-B’. The next two experiments examine the possi-
bilities that people think about not only for ordinary causal conditionals
but also for counterfactual causal conditionals, using a paraphrasing
method. We switched to the method of paraphrasing – a deliberative
interpretation task (Fillenbaum, 1976) – because our account of the
differences in the mental representation of causal conditionals and
counterfactuals commits us to predict that differences should be
observed in deliberative interpretation.
3. Experiments 2a and 2b
The aim of the two experiments was to compare the mental repre-
sentations of causal conditionals in the indicative mood, e.g., ‘if the
ignition key was turned then the car started’ and causal counterfactuals
in the subjunctive mood, ‘if the ignition key had been turned then the
car would have started’. Enabling causal conditionals are understood
by considering multiple possibilities, as shown in Experiments 1aand 1b. Counterfactual conditionals also require individuals to envisage
multiple possibilities (Byrne, 2005). Importantly, for counterfactuals,
individuals must also keep track of the epistemic status of the multiple
possibilities. They must update their mental representation to reﬂect
that one possibility corresponds to the presupposed facts and the
other possibility corresponds to the conjecture. Hence we hypothesised
that participantswould construct different sorts of paraphrases of indic-
ative and subjunctive causal conditionals, when asked to rephrase the
conditionals without using the word ‘If’. We expected that participants
would use different sorts of words to replace ‘if’ to convey the causality
and counterfactuality of the conditionals. In everyday life people
convey conditional relations by using a variety of connectives (Byrne
& Johnson-Laird, 1992; Fillenbaum, 1974). These connectives may
convey different nuances of meaning resulting in subtly different inter-
pretations of a conditional relation (Byrne, 2007).
Causal relations can be conveyedwithout using ‘if’ in different ways,
e.g., ‘because’, ‘so’, ‘as a consequence’, or by emphasising temporality,
e.g., ‘and then’, ‘after’, ‘when’. We expected that participants would
construct paraphrases of indicative causal conditionals that reﬂected
the causally related possibilities that they thought about: for instance,
we expected that participants would rely on constructions that reﬂect
the causal (e.g., because) or temporal (e.g., when) nature of the relation
and which may be considered to imply more than a single conjunctive
possibility (e.g., Barrouillet & Lecas, 2000; Byrne, 2007; Snitzer Reilly,
1986). Counterfactual relations can also be conveyed without using
‘if’ in different ways, e.g., ‘should’ (e.g., ‘should A happen…’), ‘were’
(e.g, ‘were X to happen…’), or ‘had’ (e.g., ‘had X happened…’). We
expected that participants would construct paraphrases of counterfac-
tual causal conditionals that reﬂect not only the multiple possibilities
that they have thought about, but also the nature of their epistemic sta-
tus, that the conjecture differs from the presupposed facts (e.g., ‘should’,
‘had’, ‘were’). Participants were asked to paraphrase causal conditionals
with enabling relations, e.g., ‘if the ignition key was turned the car
started’, and also causal conditionals with strong causal relations, e.g.,
‘if Joe cut his ﬁnger it bled’, and weak causal relations, e.g., ‘if the apples
were ripe they fell off the tree’.
We carried out two experiments that differed only in the provision
of a context for the conditional. In Experiment 2a participants
paraphrased conditionals presented in isolation. Experiment 2b repli-
cated Experiment 2a but participants were asked to paraphrase the
conditionals presented in the context of explicit enablers and alternative
causes to ensure that the results were independent of any differences
between participants in their interpretations. The two experiments
produced the same results and accordingly we report them together.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The participants in Experiment 2awere 30members of Trinity College
Dublin's Psychology School participant panel. There were 23 women
and 7 men, whose mean age was 53 years (range 21–72 years). They
received 8 euro for taking part in the experiment. One participant was
eliminated from the analysis because of failure to complete the task.
The participants in Experiment 2b were 41 Trinity College Dublin
psychology undergraduates, who received course credit for their partici-
pation. There were 28 women and 13 men and their average age was
22 years (range 17–51 years).
3.1.2. Materials
The materials for Experiment 2a were 24 conditional statements, 12
in the indicative mood and the past tense and 12 in the subjunctive
mood and the past tense. In each of the 2 linguistic moods, there were
4 enabling relations, 4 strong causes, and 4weak causes. The conditionals
were adapted from Cummins (1995) and included those identiﬁed by
participants there as having the following properties: (i) few alternative
causes and many disabling conditions, i.e., enabling relations (e.g., if the
Table 2
Categories of connectives used in the paraphrases produced in Experiments 2a and 2b.
Category Connectives
Temporal When, and then, then, after, as soon as, whenever, following,
once, upon, on, always B each time A
Causal By, causes, because, in order, as, so, for, indicates, shows, as a
result of, as a consequence, usually produces, A-ing…B
Conditional Provided, to, means, in the event of
Subjunctive Should…would (i.e., ‘should Joseph cut his ﬁnger, it would bleed’)
Had…. would have (e.g., ‘had the match been struck, the ﬂame
would have appeared’), would have …had
Were …would (e.g., ‘were Alvin to read without his glasses,
he would get a headache’)
Conjunctive And, and therefore
Note: some connectivesmay be considered to belong tomore than one category, e.g., ‘as a
result of’ can be considered to be both temporal and causal; in these caseswe assigned the
connective to the category on the basis of its primary use in the paraphrase.
2 Of the 696 responses (29 participants×24 paraphrases), 3% were eliminated be-
cause they used ‘if’ in the paraphrase contrary to the instructions, or merely asserted
‘yes’, or provided an explanation rather than a paraphrase.
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causes and few disabling conditions, i.e., weak causes (e.g., if Alvin read
without his glasses then he got a headache), and (iii) few alternative
causes and few disabling conditions, i.e., strong causes (e.g., if Joseph
cut his ﬁnger then it bled). The materials for Experiment 2b employed
the same conditionals but they were embedded in scenarios, similar to
those in Experiments 1a and 1b, e.g.: ‘Jason was talking to Nancy about
her car. Jason told Nancy that if the ignition key was turned, then the
car started. Jason also told Nancy that the car started when the battery
was charged. When Nancy went to her car she saw that the car had
started. Nancy went to buy some sponges.’
In this enabling example, the scenario information ‘the car started
when the battery was charged’ was designed to ensure that the causal
conditional ‘if the ignition key was turned, then the car started’ was
interpreted as an enabling causal relation. For a weak cause, e.g., ‘if
water was poured on the campﬁre, then the ﬁre went out’ the scenario
information referred to an alternative cause, e.g., ‘Lisa also told Brian
that the ﬁre went out when sand was poured on it’ so that the causal
conditional was interpreted as a weak cause; for a strong cause, e.g., ‘if
Joseph cut his ﬁnger then it bled’ the information referred simply to
the location of individuals when the consequent occurred ‘Joseph's
ﬁnger bled when he was at the kitchen sink’ so that the causal condi-
tional was interpreted as a strong cause. We included these different
sorts of causes for generality; our primary interest is in the difference
between causal conditionals and causal counterfactuals, and in fact
there were no differences between the three sorts of causes in the para-
phrases that participants produced, and so we focus on the differences
between causal conditionals and causal counterfactuals.
Each participant was given 12 of these scenarios, 6 that contained an
indicative conditional and 6 that contained a subjunctive conditional.
Within the two blocks of 6 scenarios they received 2 strong causes,
2 weak causes and 2 enabling conditions.
3.1.3. Design and procedure
In both experiments, participants acted as their own controls. The
conditionals were presented in counterbalanced blocks (indicative
versus subjunctive) and the types of causes were randomised within
the 2 blocks. In Experiment 2a the same content was used in the
indicative and subjunctive blocks and in Experiment 2b each content
appeared in either the indicative mood or the subjunctive mood for
different participants. There were three conjunctions and disjunctions
at ﬁxed regular intervals as ﬁllers.
In both experiments, participants were tested individually. They
were given a booklet with the following instructions, adapted from
Fillenbaum (1976):
Your task will consist of rephrasing each sentence as accurately as
you can. You should try to keep its meaning as much as possible,
but without using the word ‘IF’. Imagine that you are rewording
each sentence for someone else so that they can make sense of it
as fully and exactly as possible. Your task is not to improve the
sentences or make them more sensible, but to paraphrase them,
rewording each in a way that captures its meaning as accurately
as possible.
There was no time limit and completion of the task took about
20–30 min.
3.2. Results and discussion
Causal counterfactuals were paraphrased differently from causal
conditionals. The results of both experiments showed that causal
counterfactuals were paraphrased most often by using subjunctive
constructions that preserved their counterfactuality; in contrast,
indicative causal conditionals were paraphrasedmost oftenwith causal
or temporal connectives. Participants' paraphrases were categorisedaccording to the type of connective thatwas used in place of ‘if’. Connec-
tives were categorised based on their dictionary deﬁnitions. Five main
categories of paraphraseswere identiﬁed: causal, temporal, conditional,
and conjunctive and a ﬁfth category that we labelled ‘subjunctive’ (e.g.,
‘had A happened B would have happened’), as shown in Table 2. Other
categories had fewer than 5% of responses (e.g., disjunctive) and were
not included in the analyses.
In Experiment 2a, 20% of the ﬁnal overall set of paraphrases were
categorised by an independent rater and there was 80% agreement on
the assignments (with the exception of the subjunctive category
which the independent rater had categorised as causal).2 A further
ﬁve judges were asked to categorise 16% of the responses that had
proved difﬁcult to categorise (e.g., ‘reading without his glasses gave
Alvin a headache’). In Experiment 2b an independent rater categorised
20% of the paraphrases and there was 75% agreement.
In both experiments, Wilcoxon's signed ranks tests showed that, as
we expected, participants used subjunctive constructions to paraphrase
counterfactual conditionals more often than indicative conditionals
(Experiment 2a: 36% versus 4%, z=3.72, N−Ties=20, pb .001;
Experiment 2b: 39% versus 13%, z=3.9, N−Ties=24, pb .001), as
Table 3 shows. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that
paraphrases of counterfactuals attempt to preserve their unique charac-
teristic that the epistemic status of the conjecture is contrastedwith the
presupposed facts. In contrast, participants used temporal connectives
to paraphrase indicative conditionals more often than counterfactual
conditionals, as we expected (Experiment 2a: 49% versus 22%, z=
3.58, N−Ties=25, pb .001; Experiment 2b: 53%versus 32%,Wilcoxon's
z=3.97, N−Ties=34, pb .001), as Table 3 shows. Unexpectedly how-
ever, there were no differences between paraphrases of indicative and
counterfactual conditionals that used connectives that were causal
(Experiment 2a: 28% in each case; Experiment 2b: 18% versus 15%,
z=.92, N−Ties=21, p>.05 and the comparison had 80% power to
detect a difference of .03). Nonetheless, the results indicate that para-
phrases of indicative causal conditionals convey the multiple possibili-
ties consistent with the causal conditional by using causal or temporal
connectives. There were few paraphrases that were merely conjunctive
(Experiment 2a: 9% versus 5%, z=1.39, N−Ties=11, p=.16, and
the comparison had 80% power to detect a difference of .04;
Experiment 2b: .4% in each case), and few that were conditional
(Experiment 2a: 6% in each case; Experiment 2b: 10% versus 9%, z=
.52, N−Ties=13, p>.05 and the comparison had 80% power to detect
a difference of .03).
Participants paraphrased counterfactual conditionals by referring
not to the mentioned components (A, B) but to the presupposed
Table 3
Percentages of each type of connective as a function of type of conditional, indicative or
subjunctive in Experiments 2a and 2b.
Connective Indicative Subjunctive
Experiment 2a 2b 2a 2b
Temporal 49 53 22 32
Causal 28 18 28 15
Subjunctive 4 13 36 39
Conditional 6 10 6 9
Conjunctive 9 0.4 5 0.4
Note: only categories with 5% or more responses in one cell were included.
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ﬁnger didn't bleed because he hadn't cut it’), usually in conjunction
with a causal connective; they referred only to the mentioned compo-
nents for indicative conditionals. In Experiment 2b, no paraphrases
focused on the presupposed facts, perhaps because the context
scenarios asserted that the consequent of the conditional had occurred
(e.g., ‘Joseph's ﬁnger bled’). In both experiments, the same patterns
were observed in each category for strong causes, weak causes, and
enablers and there were no signiﬁcant differences between them.
The results show that people paraphrased counterfactual condi-
tionals by using subjunctive phrases such as ‘had the trigger been
pulled, the bullet would have ﬁred’. The subjunctive construction
does away with the ‘if’ connective but maintains the counterfactual
reference to a presupposed possibility corresponding to the facts,
‘the trigger was not pulled and the bullet did not ﬁre’, as well as to
a counterfactual conjecture, ‘the trigger was pulled and the bullet
ﬁred’. Importantly, participants did not tend to paraphrase counterfactu-
al conditionals by using connectives such as ‘when’ or ‘because’. In
contrast, they paraphrased indicative causal conditionals primarily by
using causal connectives such as ‘because’ and temporal connectives
such as ‘when’.
The results are consistent with the proposal that people under-
stand an indicative causal conditional (if the ignition key was turned
then the car started) by thinking initially about the causal possibilities
(e.g., the ignition key was turned and the car started, the ignition key
was turned and the car did not start): they can readily capture these
possibilities by using temporal connectives (when the ignition key
was turned the car started) or causal connectives (the car started
because the ignition key was turned). The results are also consistent
with the proposal that, in contrast to their understanding of a causal
conditional, they understand a counterfactual conditional (if the igni-
tion key had been turned then the car would have started) by think-
ing about the conjecture (the ignition key was turned and the car
started), and they also think about the presupposed facts (the ignition
key was not turned and the car did not start); they tend to capture
these two possibilities by maintaining the subjunctive construction
(had the ignition key been turned, the car would have started). Of
course the data reported here do not provide evidence that participants
understood the original counterfactual conditional by thinking about
two possibilities; nonetheless the data are consistent, together with
earlier evidence (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Egan et al., 2009; Thompson &
Byrne, 2002), with the theoretical proposal that participants under-
stand counterfactuals by envisaging both the presupposition and the
facts.
Participants' paraphrases relied on counterfactual expressions
essentially equivalent to the counterfactual conditional and they
clearly chose structures from their linguistic repertoire that preserved
the original meaning. The use of the subjunctive construction may
merely reﬂect a superﬁcial strategy that provides minimal compliance
with the task demands (the paraphrase removes ‘if’ but does not
employ an alternative connective). However, the observation that
participants in some cases refer directly to the presupposed facts intheir paraphrases (not-B because not-A) suggests that their use of the
subjunctive construction is a genuine attempt to capture the possibili-
ties conveyed by the counterfactual conditional.
No paraphrases used probabilistic terms such as ‘probably’ or
‘maybe’ or ‘likely’ and very few used related terms such as ‘usually’,
or ‘at times’; very few used modal auxiliaries such as ‘may’, or ‘could’
(2% of all paraphrases in Experiment 2a and 1% in Experiment 2b).
On the probability view of conditionals, participants understand a
causal conditional by supposing the antecedent A, assessing the
likelihood of B and the likelihood of not-B, and computing a numer-
ical ﬁgure to insert in their mental representation of the conditional
to indicate their degree of belief in the causal relation, e.g. A→B 0.7
(Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004; Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans,
Handley, & Sloman, 2007; see also Oaksford & Chater, 2007). It
seems plausible therefore to derive the prediction that individuals
would attempt to capture the probabilistic degree of belief in their
paraphrases. The relative absence of such terms goes against the
probabilistic view.
Paraphrases of causal counterfactuals ‘if A had been then B
would have been’ convey the two possibilities with which they are
consistent, a possibility corresponding to the conjecture (A and B),
and a possibility corresponding to the presupposed facts (not-A and
not-B). The availability of these multiple possibilities has been
found to increase the frequency of inferences that participants make
from counterfactuals (Byrne & Tasso, 1999). In particular, participants
make more of the inferences corresponding to the presupposed
facts from counterfactuals compared to ordinary conditionals (not-A
therefore not-B, and not-B therefore not-A). In the ﬁnal two experi-
ments, we examine the inferences that individuals make from causal
counterfactuals, and we focus on causal counterfactuals presented
with explicit information about other enabling causes and alternative
causes. We switched to the method of measuring inferences – a reli-
able and long-standing indirect measure of mental representations
(e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006) – because our account of differences in
the mental representations of causes and counterfactuals commits
us to the prediction that there should accordingly be differences in
inferences from them.4. Experiment 3a and 3b
The aim of Experiments 3a and 3b was to test whether people's
inferences are suppressed from a causal counterfactual when it is
presented in the context of a story that makes available explicit infor-
mation about other enabling causes and alternative causes, compared
to when it is presented with no such information.We gave participants
counterfactuals such as ‘if Jane had taken the newer drug, she would
have won the race’ and compared them to ordinary conditionals ‘if
Jane took the newer drug then shewon the race’. Participants evaluated
inferences corresponding to modus ponens (Jane took the newer drug
therefore she won the race), modus tollens (Jane did not win the race
therefore she did not take the newer drug), afﬁrmation of the consequent
(Jane won the race therefore she took the newer drug) and denial of the
antecedent (Jane did not take the newer drug therefore she did not win
the race).
In Experiment 3a we compared the inferences that participants
made from (a) a causal conditional, (b) a causal counterfactual
presented in isolation, and (c) a counterfactual they created themselves
after they had read a story. For example, one story was about a compet-
itive runner taking awell-known and legal painkillerwith side effects of
fatigue who lost a race. The story made available a conjectured causal –
now counterfactual – relation (taking the newer drug causes winning
the race) as well as counterexamples of disablers (taking the newer
drug but still experiencing pain and not winning the race) and of alter-
native causes (not injuring herself, not experiencing side effects, and
winning the race). We gave participants the following sort of story
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‘Jane is a runner and since the age of eight she has competed in the
sprint races in local track and ﬁeld events. Up through school she
had won every race in which she had competed. It was at the age
of 13 that she began to dream about the Olympics. At the age of 18,
before starting college, she decides to give the Olympics one all
out shot. She makes the Irish Olympic team for the 400 metre
race. On the day before the 400 metre race, in a freak accident
during training, she sprains her left ankle. Although there is no
break or fracture, when she tries to run, the pain is excruciating.
Her trainer tells her about many advances in pain killing medica-
tions and assures her that she will still be able to participate. He
recommends that she chooses between two drugs, both legal
according to Olympic guidelines. One is awell-known painkiller that
has been proved effective but also has some serious side effects
including temporary nausea and drowsiness. The other painkiller
is a newer and less well-known drug. Although the research
suggests that the newer drug might be a more effective painkiller,
its side effects are not yet known because it has not been widely
used. After considerable thought, she elects to go with the more
well-known drug. On the day of the race, although there is no pain
in her ankle, she already begins to feel the nausea and ﬁnds herself
ﬁghting off fatigue. She ﬁnishes in fourth place, only 1 tenth of a
second from a bronze medal, 4 tenths from a silver, and 5 tenths
from a gold medal. After the event, she learns that some athletes in
other events who were suffering from similar injuries used the
other, newer drug. They felt no pain and experienced no side effects.
Imagine that in the days and weeks following the race Jane thinks
“if only…”. How do you think she completed this thought?
When people are asked to complete ‘if only…’ sentences, most tend
to focus on the same sorts of things, such as exceptional events (Dixon&
Byrne, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), actions (Byrne & McEleney,
2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), and controllable events (Girotto,
Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991), at least when they read about the events
(Pighin, Byrne, Ferrante, Gonzalez, & Girotto, 2011). Many readers
complete the sentence about Jane by creating the counterfactual ‘if
only Jane had taken the newer drug she would have won the race’
(Boninger et al., 1994; McCloy & Byrne, 2002). We hypothesised that
reasoners would make fewer inferences from a counterfactual in the
context of such a story because their interpretation of the counterfactu-
al would be inﬂuenced by the provision of counterexamples about
disablers and additional causes.
In Experiment 3b we compared the inferences they made from a
counterfactual presented in isolation, to the inferences they made
from a counterfactual presented to them in the context of a story
without the information about disablers and additional causes, to es-
tablish that differences in inference frequency occurred because of
the presence of disablers and additional causes rather than the mere
presence of a story. We also compared the inferences people made
from a counterfactual in a story with counterexamples, but for
which they were provided with a ready made counterfactual, to es-
tablish that differences in inference frequency did not occur merely
because of the self-generated nature of the counterfactual.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
The participants in Experiment 3a were 63 volunteers from Trinity
College Dublin. There were 14 men and 49 women and their
age range was 15 to 49 years of age. They were assigned to one
of three groups, ordinary conditional (n=20), counterfactual (n=
21), and story-with-counterexamples (n=22). The participants in
Experiment 3b were 63 volunteers from Trinity College. There were19 men and 43 women and their age range was 15 to 46 years of
age (one participant did not disclose their age and gender). They
were assigned to one of three conditions, counterfactual (n=19),
story-without-counterexamples (n=22) and story-without-if only-
(n=22).
4.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was the same in both experiments. Participants
were tested in small groups. The tasks were presented in a booklet
and the ﬁrst page contained the following instructions: “This booklet
contains three scenarios. The scenarios and associated tasks are about
how people think in their daily lives and are not tests of intelligence.
Each scenario is followed by a set of questions. Please read each
scenario carefully and answer the questions that follow. Please
answer the questions in the order in which they are presented and
do not try to change your answers once you have written them.”
The experiment took about 10 min.
4.1.3. Materials
In Experiment 3a, the materials for the ordinary conditional condi-
tion were three conditionals in the indicative mood and the past
tense: ‘if Jane took the newer drug then she won the race’, ‘if
Mrs Wallace pleaded with her husband then he lived’, and ‘if the
taxi driver picked up Eugene and Tina then they arrived safely’. For
the counterfactual conditional condition, the three conditionals
were in the subjunctive mood and the past tense, e.g., ‘if Jane had
taken the newer drug then she would have won the race’. For the
story-with-counterexample condition, the counterfactual inference
task was presented after a story and after participants had created
their own ‘if only’ counterfactual. The stories were adapted from
common scenarios used in earlier studies (Boninger et al., 1994;
Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Wells & Gavanski, 1989). The story asserted
the facts, e.g., Jane did not take the new drug and she did not win the
race, it implied a counterfactual (taking the newer drug would
have led to winning the race) as well as counterexamples including
potential disablers (e.g., taking the newer drug but still experiencing
pain) and alternatives (e.g., not injuring herself). Participants in this
condition completed a sentence about how the outcome could have
turned out differently ‘if only…’.
In Experiment 3b the materials for the counterfactual condition
were the same as Experiment 3a, the materials for the story-without-
if-only condition were the same as Experiment 3a's story-with-
counterexample condition but participants did not complete an ‘if
only’ sentence completion task, and the materials for the story-
without-counterexample condition were the same as Experiment 3a's
story-with-counterexample condition but references to an alternative
to the antecedent and outcome were removed from the stories
(see Appendix A) and participants did not complete an ‘if only’
sentence completion task.
Each participant completed four sorts of inferences corresponding
to modus ponens, modus tollens, denial of the antecedent, and afﬁrma-
tion of the consequent, for each of the three contents (12 inferences).
They chose their conclusion from a set of three conclusions, e.g.,
(a) she won the race, (b) she did not win the race, and (c) she may
or may not have won the race. Participants were scored as having
endorsed an inference if they chose the option corresponding to the
inference (i.e., A therefore B, B therefore A, not-A therefore not-B,
not-B therefore not-A). For example, for the modus ponens premises,
‘if Jane took the newer drug then she won the race. Jane took the
newer drug’, participants were scored as having endorsed the inference
if they chose option (a) above, and as not having endorsed it if they
chose (b) or (c). The four inferences were presented in a randomised
order for each participant within each block corresponding to each
content, and the three contents were presented in six counterbalanced
orders.
Table 4
Percentages of each type of inference endorsed in the conditions of Experiment 3a and 3b
(the remainder in each cell is the percentage of responses of the opposite of the inference
or responses that the conclusion may or may not follow).
Inference MP AC MT DA
Experiment 3a
Conditional 80 40 58 20
Counterfactual 86 46 81 46
Story with counterexamples 49 53 45 59
Experiment 3b
Counterfactual 86 63 81 58
Story with counterexamples and without ‘if only’ 42 39 48 32
Story without counterexamples 68 44 59 41
Key: MP = modus ponens, AC = afﬁrmation of the consequent, MT = modus tollens,
and DA = denial of the antecedent.
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In Experiment 3a, Mann Whitney tests on the comparison
between ordinary conditionals and counterfactuals showed that par-
ticipants made more modus tollens inferences from counterfactuals
(81%3 versus 58%, U=142.5, n1=21, n2=20, z=−1.934, p=
.053); the difference for the denial of the antecedent inference was
not signiﬁcant (46% versus 20%, U=144.5, z=−1.828, p=.068), as
Table 4 shows. They made the same frequency of modus ponens
(86% versus 80% U=195, z=−.476, p=.63) and afﬁrmation of the
consequent inferences (46% versus 40% U=190, z=−.543, p=.59)
in the two conditions. These results replicate earlier studies (Byrne
& Tasso, 1999; Egan et al., 2009; Thompson & Byrne, 2002).
As we predicted, participants made fewer inferences from the
counterfactual presented in a story with counterexamples compared
to the counterfactual presented in isolation, for modus ponens (49%
versus 86%, U=102, n1=22, n2=21, z=−3.338, p=.001), and
modus tollens inferences (45% versus 81%, U=118, z=−2.924, p=
.003). There were no differences for the afﬁrmation of the consequent
(53% versus 46%, U=204, z=−.691, p=.49) and denial of the ante-
cedent inferences (59% versus 46% %, U=190, z=−1.045, p=.296).
For the story-with-counterexamples, participants completed an ‘if
only…’ sentence. Their ‘if only’ sentences corresponded to the
expected counterfactual, e.g., ‘if she had taken the other drug…’ on
67% of trials; their remaining ‘if only’ thoughts tended to focus on a
prior event that had led up to the counterfactual choice, e.g., ‘if only
she hadn't injured her ankle…’. The ‘if only’ thoughts generated by
participants validate the idea that the majority of participants pro-
duced the same counterfactual thought as the one participants were
asked to evaluate in the inference task. Therefore, the conditional
they were reasoning from was consistent with their beliefs about
the facts of the story. It also conﬁrms that they accepted the counter-
factual alternative suggested by the story as a way in which the out-
come could have been different.
In Experiment 3b, participants also made fewer inferences from a
counterfactual presented in a story with counterexamples but with-
out the requirement to generate the ‘if only’ counterfactual, com-
pared to the counterfactual presented in isolation, for modus ponens
(42% versus 86%, U=79, n1=19, n2=22, z=−3.597, p=.001),
modus tollens inferences (48% versus 81%, U=110, z=−2.735, p=
.006), afﬁrmation of the consequent (39% versus 63%, U=136, z=
−1.988, p=.047) and denial of the antecedent (32% versus 58%, U=
125, z=−2.305, p=.021). The result conﬁrms that it is the presence3 The percentage reﬂects the fact that the modus tollens inference was endorsed on
81% of trials (i.e. participants given if A then B, not-B, selected the option
corresponding to not-A). On the remaining 19% of trials, the opposite of the inference
was endorsed (the option corresponding to A), or the indeterminate option was cho-
sen (the option corresponding to A may or may not occur).of counterexamples in the story that is crucial rather than merely the
requirement to generate the ‘if only’ counterfactual.
There were no signiﬁcant differences between the inferences they
made from the counterfactual presented in the context of a story with
no counterexamples and a counterfactual presented in isolation, for
modus ponens (86% versus 68%, U=147, n1=19, n2=22, z=
−1.827, p=.068),modus tollens (81% versus 59%, U=142, z=−1.897,
p=.058), afﬁrmation of the consequent (63% versus 44%, U=146, z=
−1.704, p=.088) and denial of the antecedent (58% versus 41%, U=
161, z=−1.318, p=.188). This null result is suggestive that the pres-
ence of counterexamples mediates the suppression of the inferences,
rather than merely the presence of a story.
Jonckheere's trend tests on the results show a reliable trend in the
inferences from the counterfactual in isolation, the counterfactual in
the context of a story-without-counterexamples, and the counterfac-
tual in the context of a story-without-if-only, for modus ponens (86%,
68% and 42%, J=942, N=63, p=.001), modus tollens (81%, 59%, 48%,
J=865, p=.007), afﬁrmation of the consequent (63%, 44%, 39%, J=
815, p=.043) and the denial of the antecedent inferences (58%, 41%,
32%, J=819, p=.036).
The results of Experiment 3a show that reasoners made fewer
modus ponens and tollens inferences when they read a story that pro-
vided counterexamples and that required them to create the ‘if only’
counterfactual. The results of Experiment 3b showed that they
made fewer of all four inferences when they read a story that provid-
ed counterexamples even when it did not require them to create the
‘if only’ counterfactual. The effect may have been observed more
clearly in Experiment 3b because the removal of the requirement to
create the counterfactual may have removed the variability caused
by some individuals generating different counterfactuals from the
target one.
5. General discussion
How do people understand and reason from causal counterfac-
tuals, e.g., ‘if the battery had been charged the car would have started’
compared to causal conditionals, e.g., ‘if the battery was charged then
the car started’? In particular what possibilities do people envisage
when they understand a causal counterfactual, and a causal conditional
that refers to an enabling cause? The six experiments we have reported
to address these research questions provide converging evidence from
three different methods — causal conditionals as primes, paraphrases
of causal conditionals and counterfactuals, and inferences from causal
conditionals and counterfactuals. The results show that (a) people are
primed by an enabling causal conditional to readmore quickly conjunc-
tions corresponding to the possibilities ‘the battery was charged and
the car started’ and ‘the battery was charged and the car did not start’,
(b) people produce paraphrases for causal counterfactuals that capture
their counterfactuality (e.g., would…, had…, were…) whereas they
produce paraphrases for causal conditionals that emphasise their
temporal-causality (e.g., after, and so), and (c) peoplemake fewer infer-
ences from causal counterfactuals presented in a story with counterex-
amples, compared to a causal counterfactual in isolation, or a causal
counterfactual in a story with no counterexamples. We consider the
implications of these three ﬁndings in turn.
First, the ﬁrst two experiments (1a and 1b) examined the latencies
to read conjunctions corresponding to A and B, A and not-B, not-A and
B, and Not-A and Not-B, after participants had ﬁrst read an enabling
causal conditional (if A then B). The results showed that enabling causal
conditionals primed two of their consistent possibilities, A and B, and A
and not-B. The data provide support for the idea that people think
initially about two consistent possibilities when they understand
the cause (see also Sloman, Barbey, & Hotaling, 2009; Wolff, 2007).
The priming results are inconsistent with the idea that individuals eval-
uate their belief in a conditional by adding the antecedent to their
beliefs and assessing whether the consequent does or does not occur,
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and A and not-B (Evans & Over, 2004; Over et al., 2007, see also
Oaksford & Chater, 2007). Likewise, the data are incompatible with
the view that people evaluate a causal relation bymaking a contingency
judgement based on assessing the cases in which the effect is present,
with or without the cause, that is, that they think about A and B and
not-A and B (Cheng & Nisbett, 1993).
Second, the mental representation of causal indicative and sub-
junctive conditionals is different. The second two experiments (2a
and 2b) examined the paraphrases that participants produce of indic-
ative and counterfactual conditionals that express different causal re-
lations. They showed that people create different paraphrases for
causal conditionals in the indicative and the subjunctive moods. Peo-
ple paraphrase indicative causal conditionals without using ‘if’ by
using causal or temporal connectives (e.g., because, when); they
paraphrase counterfactual causal conditionals by using subjunctive
constructions (e.g., had A happened, B would have happened). We
suggest that the different paraphrases that individuals construct re-
ﬂect their different mental representations (Fillenbaum, 1974;
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1992). They rely on temporal and causal con-
nectives to capture the causal possibilities that they have thought
about initially (e.g., for enablers: A and B, A and not-B) when they un-
derstand an ordinary causal conditional (if A then B). In contrast, they
often rely on subjunctive constructions to capture the epistemically
different possibilities corresponding to the conjecture and the
presupposed facts (A and B, not-A and not-B) when they understand
a counterfactual conditional (if A had happened, B would have
happened). The subjunctive paraphrase (had A happened B would
have happened) may reﬂect a superﬁcial linguistic strategy rather
than the possibilities individuals have kept in mind (e.g., Ormerod,
Manktelow, & Jones, 1993). Nonetheless, the reference to the
presupposed facts (not-A and not-B) in some of the paraphrases sug-
gests that the subjunctive construction is a genuine attempt to capture
the possibilities conveyed by the counterfactual conditional.
Third, people make different inferences from causal counterfactuals
that they interpret in a story with counterexamples, compared to those
interpreted in isolation. The ﬁnal two experiments (3a and 3b) examined
the inferences people make from causal counterfactuals interpreted in
isolation compared to those interpreted in a storywith counterexamples.
People make fewer inferences from counterfactual conditionals in
the context of a story with disablers and alternative causes compared
to counterfactuals in isolation or counterfactuals in a story with no
counterexamples.
The experiments provide converging evidence from three very
different methods, paraphrases, priming, and inferences, that causal
conditionals and causal counterfactuals are understood by thinking
about possibilities of different sorts. Converging evidence from differ-
ent tasks may be helpful in developing a full understanding of the
way in which people mentally represent causal conditionals.Acknowledgements
The research was funded by an Irish Research Council for the
Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) Major Research Grants Scheme
grant awarded to the second author. Experiment 1b was carried out
while theﬁrst authorwas in receipt of a Postdoctoral Research Fellowship
from the Economic and Social Research Council (PTA-026-27-1688) held
at the University of Reading.Wewould like to thank GryWester for help
with data entry, and KeithMarkman, Orlando Espino, RachelMcCloy, and
the members of the joint UCD/TCD cognitive science group for their
helpful comments. Some of the results were presented at the British
Psychological Society's Cognitive Section Annual Conference in 2004,
the Cognitive Science Society's Annual Conferences in 2005 and
2006, and the European Society of Cognitive Psychology's Conference in
2005.Appendix A
1. Conditionals for Experiment 1a and 1b presented with the
additional enabler (conditionals marked with * were used in
Experiment 1b).
*If the key was turned, then the car started.He told her that the battery had to be charged for the car to start.
*If the button was pushed, then the bell rang.He told her that the wires had to be connected for the bell to ring.
*If the lever was pulled, then the chair descended.She told him that a person had to be seated for the chair to
descend.*If the soil was watered, then the plants grew.She told him that the sun had to shine for the plants to grow.
*If the sun was shining, then the tan appeared.She told him that the lotion had to be used for the tan to appear.
*If his hands were bare, then his ﬁngerprints marked.He told her that the object had to be touched for his ﬁnger-
prints to mark.*If the bowl was covered, then the dough doubled.She told him that the mixture had to contain yeast for the
dough to double.*If the lid was twisted, then the bottle opened.He told her that the sides had to be squeezed for the bottle to
open.*If the button was pushed, then the gadget launched.He told her that the object had to be vertical for the gadget to
launch.*If the coal was used, then the BBQ lit.He told her that the ﬁre-lighter had to be set for the BBQ to
light.*If the inside was touched then the pollen stained.He told her that the buds had to be open for the lilies to stain.
*If the windows were closed, then the room cooled.She told him that the conditioning had to be on for the room to
cool.If the mixture was heated, then the cake rose.She told him that the baking-powder had to be added for the
cake to rise.If the trigger was pulled, then the gun ﬁred.He told him that the bullets had to be inserted for the gun to ﬁre.
If the needle was threaded, then the machine worked.She told her that the pedal had to be pressed for the machine to
work.If the switch was ﬂipped, then the light shone.She told him that the bulb had to be inserted for the light to shine.
If the temperature was below freezing, then the snow fell.She told him that the air had to be moist for the snow to fall.
If the tap was turned, then the shower operated.She told him that the cord had to be pulled for the shower to
operate.If the batteries were charged, then the remote worked.She told him that the button had to be pressed for the remote
to work.If the plug was connected, then the headphones worked.He told her that the cable had to be intact for the headphones
to work.If the chemicals were combined, then the mixture darkened.She told him that the beakers had to be heated for the mixture
to darken.If the book was ﬁction, then her grandmother read.
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to read.If the calculator was permitted, then the student succeeded.
She told him that the tables had to be used for the students to
succeed.If the brake was depressed, then the car slowed.
She told him a lower gear had to be used for the car to slow.2. Conditionals for Experiments 2a and 2b in italics, presented in the
context of a story in Experiment 2b only (counterfactuals were the
same conditionals in the subjunctive mood).
Enabling conditions
Marcus was talking to Steven about his new gun. Marcus toldSteven that If the trigger was pulled, then the gun ﬁred. Marcus
also told Steven that the gun ﬁred when a bullet was in the
chamber. When Steven saw the gun he saw that The gun had
ﬁred. Steven went to watch a shooting competition.
Katy was talking to Jimmy about the kitchen light. Katy told Jimmy
that If the switch was ﬂipped up, then the light went on. Katy also
told Jimmy that the light went on when a bulb was in the
ﬁtting. When Jimmy walked into the kitchen he saw that The
light had gone on. Jimmy went to the supermarket.
Jason was talking to Nancy about her car. Jason told Nancy that If
the ignition key was turned, then the car started. Jason also told
Nancy that the car started when the battery was charged.
When Nancy went to her car she saw that The car had started.
Nancy went to buy some sponges.
Curtis was talking to Sarah about matches. Curtis said that If the
match was struck, then it lit. Curtis also said that the match lit
when the match was dry. When Sarah went into the living
room she saw that The match was lit. Sarah went to get some
cookies.
Strong causes
Peter was talking to Mary about his friend Joseph. Peter told Mary
that If Joseph cut his ﬁnger, then it bled. Peter also told Mary that
Joseph stood by the kitchen sink when he bled. When Mary
went into the kitchen she saw that Joseph was bleeding.
Mary went to welcome the new guests.
Andrew was talking to Jenny about a murder suspect Larry.
Andrew told Jenny that If Larry grasped the glass with his bare
hands, then his ﬁngerprints were on it. Andrew also told Jenny
that Larry was in the living room when he left his ﬁngerprints.
When the forensic report arrived Jenny saw that Larry's ﬁnger-
prints were on the glass. Jenny went to the canteen.
Julie was talking to Suzanne about her boss' house in the suburbs.
Julie told Suzanne that If the doorbell was pushed, then it rang.
Julie also told Suzanne that her boss was in the garden when
the doorbell rang. When Suzanne arrived at the house she
saw that The doorbell rang. Suzanne went into the living room.
Lisa was talking to David about a Buddhist temple. Lisa told David
that If the gong was struck, then it sounded. Lisa also told David
that the monks were by the pond when the gong sounded.
When David went into the temple he saw that The gong
sounded. David went to a meditation class.
Weak causes
Martin was talking to Thomas about the apples in the garden.
Martin told Thomas that If the apples were ripe, then they fell
from the tree. Martin also told Thomas that the apples fellfrom the tree when it was stormy. When Thomas went into
the garden he saw that The apples had fallen from the tree.
Thomas went to pick some ﬂowers.
Andy was talking to Tara about his friend Mary. Andy told Tara
that If Mary jumped into the swimming pool, then she got wet.
Andy also told Tara that Mary got wet when she had a shower.
When Tara sawMary she saw that Mary was wet. Tara went for
a massage.
Lisa was talking to Brian about the campﬁre. Lisa told Brian that If
water was poured on the campﬁre, then the ﬁre went out. Lisa
also told Brian that the ﬁre went out when sand was poured
on it. When Brian went to look at the campﬁre he saw that
The ﬁre had gone out. Brian went to brush his teeth.
Rita was talking to Sinead about her son Alvin. Rita told Sinead
that If Alvin read without his glasses, then he got a headache.
Rita also told Sinead that Alvin got a headache when he ate
chocolate. When Sinead saw Alvin she saw that Alvin had got
a headache. Sinead went to an art exhibition.
3. Stories for Experiment 3a and 3b (counterexamples information in
italics)
Runner story
Jane is a runner and since the age of eight she has competed in the
sprint races in local track and ﬁeld events. Up through school she
had won every race in which she had competed. It was at the age
of 13 that she began to dream about the Olympics. At the age of 18,
before starting college, she decides to give the Olympics one all
out shot. She makes the Irish Olympic team for the 400 metre
race. On the day before the 400 metre race, in a freak accident
during training, she sprains her left ankle. Although there is no
break or fracture, when she tries to run, the pain is excruciating.
Her trainer tells her about many advances in pain killing medica-
tions and assures her that she will still be able to participate. He
recommends that she takes a drug, legal according to Olympic
guidelines. It is a well-known painkiller that has been proved ef-
fective but also has some serious side effects including temporary
nausea and drowsiness. On the day of the race, although there is
no pain in her ankle, she already begins to feel the nausea and
ﬁnds herself ﬁghting off fatigue. She ﬁnishes in fourth place, only
1 tenth of a second from a bronze medal, 4 tenths from a silver,
and 5 tenths from a gold medal. He recommends that she chooses
between two drugs, both legal according to Olympic guidelines. One
is a well-known painkiller that has been proved effective but also
has some serious side effects including temporary nausea and drows-
iness. The other painkiller is a newer and less well-known drug. Al-
though the research suggests that the newer drug might be a more
effective painkiller, its side effects are not yet known because it has
not been widely used. After considerable thought, she elects to go
with the more well-known drug. After the event, she learns that
some athletes in other events who were suffering from similar injuries
used the other, newer drug. They felt no pain and experienced no side
effects.
Plane story
Mrs. Wallace was somewhat distressed about her husband ﬂying
from Dublin to London for a convention. She herself was afraid
of ﬂying, and neither her nor her husband had ever ﬂown any-
where before. Mr. Wallace, although a little uneasy about ﬂying
for the ﬁrst time, tried to assure his wife that everything would
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later, Mr. Wallace took his ﬂight to London. About midway through
the ﬂight, the plane crashed, tragically killing Mr. Wallace and all
others on board. In the weeks following the crash, a formal investiga-
tion found evidence from the debris and ﬂight recorder that indicated
that the plane's engine had spontaneouslymalfunctioned, leaving the
pilot no time for an emergency landing. The investigation also deter-
mined that the plane's engine was inspected thoroughly by a quali-
ﬁed maintenance team prior to takeoff. Other plane engines of the
same model were also inspected for structural ﬂaws in manufactur-
ing, but this inspection revealed that the engines were well
constructed. In the past, they had either taken the fast ferry and driven
or taken the train to their destination. On this occasion, however, Mrs.
Wallace was not accompanying her husband on this two day business
trip. Mr. Wallace told his wife that he was going to book a ﬂight
because he didn't want to spend so many hours on the ferry and driving
or taking the train. Mr. Wallace booked a ﬂight even though he had orig-
inally considered taking the ferry. She thought about pleading with him
to take the train instead. But she didn't because she felt silly doing so,
even though she knew that her husband would deﬁnitely have changed
his plans at her request if she pleaded.
Taxi story
Eugene and Tina were a young married couple who lived in the
country. Both were partially paralysed and conﬁned to wheel-
chairs. They had met four years before when Tina was a counsellor
with the Irish Paraplegic Association, had fallen in love, and were
married one year later. On this particular evening, they were
going into town. Eugene and Tina took Tina's car, which was
equipped with special hand controls. In order to get into town
from their house, they had to travel across a bridge over Rupert
River. A severe storm the night before had weakened the structure
of the bridge. About 5 min before Eugene and Tina reached it, a
section of the bridge collapsed. In the dark, Eugene and Tina
drove off the collapsed bridge and plummeted into the river
below. Both of them were badly injured. On this particular evening,
Eugene had phoned to request a taxi to take them into town. When
the taxi driver arrived, Eugene and Tina were waiting by the street.
On seeing that they were both in wheelchairs, the taxi driver refused
their fare because he thought it would be too crowded in the taxi with
both of them and the wheelchairs. So the taxi driver headed back into
town without them. Because there was no time to call another taxi,
Eugene and Tina took Tina's car, which was equipped with special
hand controls. In order to get into town from their house, they had
to travel across a bridge over Rupert River. A severe storm the night
before had weakened the structure of the bridge. About 5 minutes be-
fore Eugene and Tina reached it, a section of the bridge collapsed. In
the dark, Eugene and Tina drove off the collapsed bridge and
plummeted into the river below. Both of them were badly injured. It
is later reported that the taxi driver had reached the bridge about
15 minutes before them, and made it safely across.References
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